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hold the dignity of man and avoid his being
discarded as a human being simply because
he is helpless and no longer productive.' 1 ,

Recent Decision:
State's Right of Inquiry
The scales of justice not only balance
right and wrong, but frequently are used
to decide which of two competing rights
may be exercised. The petitioning schoolteachers in Shelton v. Tucker' challenged
a state's right of inquiry on the ground that
it abridged their individual right to freedom
of association. The State of Arkansas had
passed a statute that compelled -every
teacher, as a condition of employment in
state-supported schools, to file an annual
affidavit listing every organization to which
he has belonged or regularly contributed
within the preceding five years. The United
States Supreme Court held that the statute,
as applied to teachers without job security
safeguards, violated their rights under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
by extending the state's right of inquiry
into areas not reasonably related to occupational competence and fitness.
Realizing the sensitive area in which a
teacher works, the state has a vital and
necessary right of inquiry into the fitness
and competency of the teachers it employs. 2
A "rule of reason ' 3 will be applied to
determine whether the state, in the exercise
of legitimate inquiry, employs means which
111 Hearing Be/ore N.Y. Joint Leg. Committee on

Problems of the Aging, at 24 (March 10, 1960)
(statement of Justice Brenner). For a recent
article pointing out the current anxiety over this
problem in New York see DeCain, Commitment
Procedures and the Non-Mentally Ill, 33 N.Y.S.
BAR J. 151 (1961).

1 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
2 Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 405
(1958); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485,
493 (1952).
3

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568-69

(1951)

(concurring opinion).
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are consistent with the teacher's constitutional rights. In other words, when the state
exercises its police power over liberty of
the mind, it must do so in a reasonable
manner.
It is reasonable for the state to protect
the "integrity and competency ' 4 of public
employees by restricting them from doing
acts, which, if done by private individuals,
could not be restrained by legislative action.5 Any direct inquiry based upon the
standards of competency and fitness set up
for public employment will be held reasonable.6 All the state must establish is that
the questions asked would be directly determinative of whether the required standards of competency and fitness have been
met. 7 Whenever the state asks questions

"wholly unrelated"" to the standards, it will
be an unconstitutional infringement on
personal liberties. 9 These liberties are guaranteed by the due process clause of the
4Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
5 See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951); ci. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947). Taking an active part in
political campaigns is not a right guaranteed to
government employees. "[F]undamental human
rights are not absolutes.... [The] Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom...
to protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship ..... Id. at
95-96. See Comment, 65 YALE L. J. 1159 (1956).
6 Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958);
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
7 Ibid.
s Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558
(1956).
9 An inquiry for the purpose of rooting out subversives in the school system drawn without regard to
the presence or absence of guilt was deemed an unreasonable use of the state authority in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Whenever
the dismissal is based upon inferences drawn from
a valid assertion of a constitutional right, rather
than from proven facts, such dismissal will be
termed an unreasonable use of delegated power.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

fourteenth amendment. Even if the state
meets the procedural requirements of due
process, the inquiry may still be unreasonable, if the substantive protections of due
process have in fact been breached.
In the instant case, the question is
whether demanding disclosure of all the
organizations to which a teacher belongs
has a direct bearing on whether the standards of competency and fitness have been
met. Judicial concepts of what is "reasonable" are subject to variance, and the facts
here involved precipitated a dissent which
argued that the statute was reasonable and
that the information disclosed was directly
relevant. Where the teacher spends his
time, and the nature of his contacts and
associations are, in the opinion of the dissent, pertinent to ascertaining his professional fitness. But, as the majority indicated,
this view does not give due weight to the
practical fact that such an inquiry is in
fact a "fishing expedition," 10 resulting in
an unwarranted inhibition of free association which the Court has allied to free
speech - a right which lies at the foundation of our society. 1 Many, if not all, of the
relationships inquired into by this expedition could have no possible bearing upon
occupational competence or fitness, but
could freeze scholarship "in an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust. "12 The power to
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252
(1957). If the answers to the questions asked a
teacher will give no relevant information as to his
fitness, then the inquiry must be considered unreasonable. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956).

10 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
214, 221 (1951).

"l Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957).

12

inquire must be so reasonably exercised as
not to unduly infringe upon the protected
3
freedom of association.'
In the case of NAACP v. Alabama,14 the
Court, considering the purpose and climate
in which the NAACP was carrying on its
activities, held that a statute requiring
membership lists was repugnant to the
Constitution. The Court felt that the stated
motive, the regulation of intrastate commerce, was a mere subterfuge, the real
purpose being to obtain membership lists,
which, if published, would subject these
persons to harassment and embarrassment,
in breach of their right to free association.
In Bates v. City of Little Rock,1 5 the
state failed to show, other than by a mere
assertion of proper motive, a public interest
to be protected. The Court, using the same
criteria as in NAACP v. Alabama, placed
the individual right above the state's power.
Yet, when the state has asserted and proved
a proper motive, as in the case where a
state statute required disclosure of membership lists of the Ku Klux Klan, the statute
will be held constitutional as being related
to the public interest. 16 In the present case,
13

See cases cited note 11 supra.

14 357 U.S. 449 (1958). "Inviolability of privacy

in group association may in many circumstances
be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." Id. at 462. "Whether there was

'justification' ... turns solely on the substantiality
of Alabama's interest in obtaining the membership
lists.... [The Court was] unable to perceive that
the disclosure of the names of petitioner's rankand-file members has a substantial bearing [upon
intrastate business] .. ." Id. at 464.

15 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 27-8
U.S. 63 (1928). The decision was based on the
particular character of the Klan's activity which
involved acts of unlawful intimidation and violence. The Court assumed that the legislature,
when it passed the statute, was aware of this, and
the Court itself took judicial notice of these facts.
16

7
the Court divided on the question of
whether the statute itself violated the traditional notions of free association or whether
an actual abuse of the statute would have
to be perpetrated. The dissent adhered to
the latter view. The majority, although
holding the statute violative of the fourteenth amendment because of its unlimited
and indiscriminate scope, may well have
considered the climate in which the statute
was passed. Was this "fishing expedition"
really searching for occupational competence, or is the state attempting to learn if
the teacher belongs to the NAACP or any
other "unpopular" organization?
The scrutiny to which the Court has put
the present statute raises the question of
whether the Court viewed it as a possible
collateral attack upon its decisions on civil
rights. The statute as it stood was a potentially powerful weapon of subtle noncompliance with the spirit of the Brown v.
Board of Educ.' 7 decision. To understand
this it is necessary to consider the job security under which teachers are employed in
Arkansas. In Arkansas the teacher serves
at the absolute will of those to whom the
information must be entrusted.18 Thus, a
17

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

18 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960).
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teacher may be dismissed without assigned
cause. The Court, impliedly at least, considered it entirely possible that the information disclosed pursuant to the statute
would be used to cause the teacher to be
dismissed.1 9
The Court leaves open the question of
whether the statute would be constitutional
if the teachers were protected by tenure,
civil service, or some other means of job
security.20 Assuming this was the procedure, the state would then have to show
cause for a teacher's dismissal. The disclosure of a cause required under the procedural aspects of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment would permit
the judiciary to discover any subtle erosion
of the teacher's substantive rights. This judicial power would allow discovery of any
dismissal based upon an improper motive.
Under such a safeguard, it may not have.
been necessary for the Court to take notice
of the proximate and probable improper
motive before there was an actual abuse.
But, without these job security safeguards,
the Court was properly constrained to take
notice now, or any unjust dismissal under
the Arkansas school system would be beyond the Court's protection.
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 482.

